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INTRODUCTION 
“The vast expansion of our national economy during the past 
several decades has provided the primary rationale for expanding the 
permissible reach of a State’s jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”1 
General jurisdiction is slowly being eroded. What was once a well-
trodden path used to hale corporate defendants into the courthouse is now 
increasingly barred or shut. In its most recent general jurisdiction opinion, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,2 the U.S. Supreme Court continued its trend 
towards divesting general jurisdiction of its utility. This is a mistake. The 
21st century’s economy is increasingly complex, and general jurisdiction 
must evolve with this complexity. Failing to do so allows intricate corporate 
structures to insulate corporate defendants from the jurisdiction of U.S 
courts. Although the theory of personal jurisdiction has come a long way 
since the landmark decisions in Pennoyer v. Neff3and International Shoe v. 
Washington,4 it must continue to evolve. Arguably, another catalytic 
opinion is needed to belatedly nudge general jurisdiction into modernity. 
This note explores the history of general jurisdiction, provides a 
means to satisfy the currently rigorous general jurisdiction standard, and 
proposes a new standard that is more cogent in the modern age. In doing so, 
Part I of this note explains the theory behind general jurisdiction and how it 
differs from specific jurisdiction, and Part II describes the history of the 
Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction jurisprudence since Pennoyer. After 
examining the theory of general jurisdiction and Supreme Court precedent 
on the issue, Part III traces the steps of the Daimler case, from the Northern 
District of California to the Supreme Court, with each courts’ nuances 
highlighted. Part IV then explains the necessary steps plaintiffs must take to 
satisfy the new rigors of general jurisdiction. Finally, Part V provides a new 
definition and standard of general jurisdiction, one that will hopefully be 
more consistent with the original theory of general jurisdiction that was first 
outlined in Pennoyer and International Shoe. 
                                                
 1. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 2. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 4. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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I. THEORY OF GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is essentially the power of a court over persons and 
things.5 More specifically, personal jurisdiction is defined as a “court’s 
power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.”6 Most, if not all, of 
the cases on personal jurisdiction, however, define the term by focusing on 
the interplay of two rights: the right of a sovereign state to exercise proper 
jurisdiction over persons within its borders, and the right of an individual to 
have life, liberty and property protected by due process of law.7 In practice, 
states use long-arm statutes to subject persons both within and without the 
state to the jurisdiction of its courts.8 It is the prerogative of the courts to 
decide if such exercises of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due 
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.9 
State long-arm statutes differ.10 Some statutes extend the 
jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by the Due Process Clause.11 Other 
statutes are more nuanced and delineate the situations in which a person’s 
conduct will subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state.12 
This section on the theory of general jurisdiction is intended to 
serve several purposes. First, understanding the theory of personal 
jurisdiction is instructive for defining the appropriate scope of general 
jurisdiction. To do this, an exploration of background principles of personal 
                                                
 5. Jurisdiction is defined as “[a] government’s general power to exercise authority 
over all persons and things within its territory; esp., a state’s power to create interests that 
will be recognized under common-law principles as valid in other states.” Jurisdiction, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 6. Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed, 2014). Black’s Law 
Dictionary further defines personal jurisdiction as “jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal 
rights, rather than merely over property interests.” Id. 
 7. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do With It? Due Process, 
Personal Jurisdiction, & the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729–30 (2012). 
 8. See generally 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: CIVIL LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION, 0020 SURVEYS 10 (Westlaw 2015) [hereinafter STATE SURVEYS] 
(“Generally, a court has personal jurisdiction over the residents of the state in which the 
court is situated. Each state has a ‘longarm’ [sic] statute, which specifies the circumstances 
under which a nonresident may be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.”). 
 9. See Eric C. Hawkins, General Jurisdiction & Internet Contacts: What Role, if Any, 
Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2371, 2372. 
The theory of judicial review found in Marbury v. Madison provides the rationale for the 
federal courts’ role of defining the scope of the Due Process Clause. Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)., 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945). 
 10. See STATE SURVEYS, supra note 8. 
 11. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (“A court of this state may 
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the 
United States.”). 
 12. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 209D § 2-201 (West 1988). 
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jurisdiction is needed. Second, this section discusses the actual theory of 
general jurisdiction: where it comes from and what it does. Third, this 
section explains the main rationales for general jurisdiction. Although many 
scholars have argued that general jurisdiction is obsolete and unworkable in 
today’s world,13 such a conclusion is shortsighted. At least 
Justice Sotomayor of the Roberts Court has reason to believe that general 
jurisdiction is alive and well, and should be preserved.14 By ensuring that 
general jurisdiction is, indeed, alive and well, the Court will prevent 
corporate defendants from unfairly avoiding the jurisdiction of state 
courts.15 
A. Personal Jurisdiction Principles 
At its core, personal jurisdiction is “simple and elegant.”16 
Describing this simplicity, Professor Simoni Grassi notes that personal 
jurisdiction is based on two fundamental ideas: connecting factors and 
reasonable expectations.17 However, the Supreme Court has not been 
entirely successful at articulating the law of personal jurisdiction in 
conjunction with this theory.18 This sub-section attempts to outline the 
theory of personal jurisdiction. 
The core of the contemporary theory of personal jurisdiction can be 
traced to Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman’s oft-cited 
article, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate.19 The heart of their theory is thus: 
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and 
the underlying controversy normally support only the 
power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or 
connected with, the very controversy that establishes 
jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to 
exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when 
jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, 
                                                
 13. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
610 (1988). 
 14. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763–73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 15. See id. at 772–73. 
 16. Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No Exit, 
47 AKRON L. REV. 617, 618 (2014). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). 
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between the forum and the person or persons whose legal 
rights are to be affected. This we call general jurisdiction.20 
As the Court has developed the doctrine of personal jurisdiction 
over the last half-century, it has approvingly cited von Mehren and 
Trautman, specifically this paragraph.21 
In the last 30 years, Professors Lea Brilmayer and Mary Twitchell 
have led the debate over personal jurisdiction.22 Portions of this scholarly 
debate concern even the terms used in describing personal jurisdiction. For 
example, Brilmayer states the following: 
Rather than using the terms “general” and “specific,” 
which she thinks mislead courts and scholars, [Professor 
Twitchell] would have us use the terms “dispute-blind” and 
“dispute-specific.” Dispute-blind jurisdiction exists when a 
court would have adjudicative jurisdiction over any cause 
of action whatsoever the defendant, or at least, as she 
sometimes qualifies this, over “most” disputes. A finding 
of dispute-specific jurisdiction, in contrast does not compel 
the conclusion that jurisdiction would exist in most or all 
other cases; instead, as Professor Twitchell sometimes 
states, it takes the “nature” of the dispute into account.23 
Essentially, Twitchell and Brilmayer are attempting to make sense 
of the Court’s often confusing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.24 
There are numerous articles that outline the theory of specific 
personal jurisdiction (or Twitchell’s “dispute-specific” jurisdiction).25 But 
                                                
 20. Id. at 1136. 
 21. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). 
 22. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1444, n.a1 (1998) (“The author wishes to thank Professor Twitchell for good humor 
and scholarly openness that is rarely encountered in such response/rejoinder episodes.”); Lea 
Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988); Mary 
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988). 
 23. Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 22, at 1446 
(citing Twitchell, supra note 13, at 613, 637). 
 24. See generally Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 
22; Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, supra note 22; Twitchell, supra note 
13. 
 25. See, e.g., James M. Brogan, Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear & McIntyre 
One Step Forward; One Step Backward?, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 811 (2013); Braham Boyce 
Ketcham, Related Contacts For Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants: 
Adopting a Two-Part Test, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 477 (2009); Linda 
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the focus of this note is general jurisdiction.26 Therefore, regarding 
background principles, all that need be remembered is this: For a court to 
exercise specific in personam jurisdiction, the lawsuit must arise out of 
“minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state.27 More 
importantly, the delineation between general and specific jurisdiction “has 
helped courts focus on their reasons for exercising jurisdiction in particular 
cases.”28 
Regarding personal jurisdiction as a whole, Professor Twitchell 
notes that there are a number of approaches to the conceptual framework of 
personal jurisdiction that are somewhat inconsistent with the original 
meaning of general and specific jurisdiction.29 She identifies two factors as 
the source of this problem: (1) courts are unsure of the meaning of general 
and specific jurisdiction and (2) courts are unsure of how to use the general-
versus-specific framework to determine when it is fair to exercise 
jurisdiction.30 The result of this confusion is what Twitchell calls: 
An impoverished body of general jurisdiction case law that 
fails to explore the question of the state’s general 
adjudicatory power over nonresident defendants, and an 
impoverished body of specific jurisdiction case law that 
fails to recognize that courts often exercise what is, in fact, 
specific jurisdiction over claims only tenuously tied to a 
defendant’s forum contacts.31 
This note attempts to make sense of this “impoverished body of 
general jurisdiction case law” and provide a reasonable understanding of 
general jurisdiction that fits in the framework of contemporary 
jurisprudence. The theory of general jurisdiction is extremely important in 
building a coherent general jurisdiction framework. That theory is discussed 
next. 
                                                                                                             
Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1619 (2001). 
 26. Reference the relative definitions, supra notes 5 & 6. 
 27. This is the hallmark language of Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945). For a more detailed discussion of specific jurisdiction, the articles mentioned supra 
at note 22 provide an excellent starting point. 
 28. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 611. 
 29. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 612. 
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B. General Jurisdiction Theory 
In her influential article, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 
Professor Twitchell explains much of the theory supporting modern-day 
general jurisdiction jurisprudence.32 Although she uses the term “dispute-
blind” instead of general jurisdiction and “dispute-specific” instead of 
personal jurisdiction, she views those terms as interchangeable. The same 
premise applies here. 
Before the 21st century and the modern understanding of personal 
jurisdiction, American courts defined jurisdiction in terms of the 
“sovereign’s relationship with the defendant or his property, rather than in 
terms of character of the suit itself.”33 During this time, the justification for 
personal jurisdiction existed solely on the criteria that define modern-day 
general jurisdiction.34 Twitchell notes, “As international and interstate 
commercial relations grew more extensive in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the nature of the dispute began to play a more prominent role 
in . . . American jurisdiction decisions.”35 Notably, this movement produced 
serious concern regarding one particular type of party: corporate 
defendants.36 This development culminated in the landmark decision of 
Pennoyer v. Neff, which Twitchell points to as the source of the dispute-
blind and dispute-specific bases of personal jurisdiction.37 Initially, the 
delineations of general jurisdiction expanded as states developed rules 
allowing jurisdiction over corporate defendants based on the corporation’s 
“consent, doing business, or presence” in the state.38 After International 
Shoe,39 however, leading commentators read the proverbial writing on the 
wall and predicted that general jurisdiction would take a backseat to 
specific jurisdiction.40 Nonetheless, International Shoe provided not only 
                                                
 32. See Twitchell, supra note 13. 
 33. Id. at 615. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 618. 
 36. Id. at 619, n.39 (“Some states and territories made foreign corporations subject to 
process if they had officers or agents in the forum or were doing business there . . . . 
However, the accepted doctrine that a corporation had no existence beyond the state of its 
incorporation . . . led other early nineteenth-century commentators and jurists to conclude 
that it could not be subject to personal jurisdiction elsewhere.”). 
 37. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 619–20. Professor Twitchell goes on to say: “The 
dominant theme of Pennoyer was that a state has absolute power over defendants or property 
found within its territorial boundaries, regardless of the nature of the dispute. Nevertheless, 
the Court in Pennoyer acknowledged that a state has some power to exercise jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants based on the state’s interest in the particular suit.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 622. 
 39. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 40. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1164. Specifically, those authors 
wrote that “the landscape that we have surveyed will gradually change; in particular, specific 
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the theoretical framework for the continued existence of personal 
jurisdiction but also a nuanced “fairness rationale” that has dominated 
modern-day personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.41 
As the doctrine of personal jurisdiction progressed, “courts 
developed rules permitting jurisdiction over disputes closely related to the 
forum but framed them in ways that paid lip service to general jurisdiction 
requirements.”42 But at its root, general jurisdiction is uniquely focused on 
the “nature of the contacts between the defendant and the forum.”43 This 
doctrine is juxtaposed with specific jurisdiction, which is focused on the 
“relationship between the forum and the dispute being litigated.”44 And, as 
Professors von Mehren and Trautman predicted, “specific jurisdiction has 
become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while general 
jurisdiction plays a reduced role.”45 
Despite that reduced role, the difference between general and 
specific jurisdiction is the focus of the inquiry. Specific jurisdiction 
examines the connection between the facts of the controversy and the 
lawsuit in question. General jurisdiction, however, examines the 
relationship between the defendant and the forum. Essentially, some 
defendants have such a close relationship with a forum that it would be 
patently unfair to insulate them from the jurisdiction of the forum’s courts, 
with no concern as to the forum’s interest in the facts of the case.46 Whereas 
specific jurisdiction may be focused on fairness to the defendant, general 
jurisdiction focuses on fairness to the forum. This theory echoes the theory 
of estoppel.47 
Unexpectedly, Professor Twitchell presents several problems with 
general jurisdiction, as well as several reasons for the endurance of general 
jurisdiction.48 As to the problems, Twitchell admits: (1) “general 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and form a considerably more significant part of the 
scene.” Id. As history would have it, they were right. 
 41. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 625. A pertinent section of the International Shoe 
opinion states: “[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations 
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe, 
326 U.S. at 318. This “fairness” rationale provides support for an expansive view of general 
jurisdiction. 
 42. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 622. 
 43. Id. at 627. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19. 
 46. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 47. In other words, there are some situations in which it would be unfair to not require 
a defendant to answer a lawsuit in a particular jurisdiction, mirroring the rationale for 
estoppel (i.e., requiring a defendant to do something that it would be unfair for him to not 
do). 
 48. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 629–33. 
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jurisdiction is outdated” and (2) “courts have no clear concept of what 
general jurisdiction is or how it relates to specific jurisdiction.”49 As to the 
endurance, or hardiness, of general jurisdiction, Twitchell recognizes that: 
(1) it fills a gap left by other jurisdictional theories; (2) it is innocuous; 
(3) it encompasses foreseeable exercises of jurisdiction; (4) it has been 
preserved by the judiciary; and (5) personal jurisdiction alone is 
inadequate.50 
General jurisdiction has been divided into four main categories or 
paradigms.51 First, there are “unique affiliations” that are in many ways the 
heart of general jurisdiction.52 The three types of unique affiliations—
domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business—decide 
many questions of personal jurisdiction in modern day legal practice.53 
Professor Brilmayer notes, “Domicile is the place with which a person has a 
settled connection for certain legal purposes, either because the person’s 
home is there or because the law assigns this significance to that place.”54 
Since the “law treats corporations like legal persons . . . the place of 
incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to 
domicile.”55 
Second, the defendant’s activities in the forum state can serve as a 
basis for general jurisdiction.56 However, this type of jurisdiction requires a 
more nuanced analysis. Although a “single activity may suffice to establish 
general jurisdiction,” some level of “continuous and systematic activities” 
is generally required.57 Third, and more controversially, transient 
jurisdiction may exist because of an “individual’s mere presence in the state 
for service of process.”58 Fourth, a party may always consent to personal 
jurisdiction, since it is a waivable affirmative defense.59 
                                                
 49. Id. at 629. 
 50. Id. at 632. 
 51. See Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 728–71. 
 52. Id. at 728. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 734. 
 56. Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 735. 
 57. Id. at 735–36. 
 58. Id. at 748. 
 59. Id. at 755. Professor Brilmayer also delves into the world of in rem and quasi in 
rem jurisdiction as forms of general jurisdiction. For purposes of this article, however, the 
nuances and intricacies of in rem jurisdiction need not be explored at length. 
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C. Rationale for General Jurisdiction 
A lawsuit based on general jurisdiction typically “involves the 
adjudication of a controversy that is centered outside the forum.”60 This 
means that the defendant must have a significant relationship with the 
forum such that notions of due process are justified61 and use of that 
relationship must comport with “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”62 Professor Brilmayer succinctly identifies the rationale 
and requirement for general jurisdiction: 
[O]nly a direct relationship between the forum and the 
defendant justifies the imposition of the state’s coercive 
power. That relationship does not rest upon the state’s right 
to regulate the outside activities, but on its power over the 
individual directly. The defendant’s local activities, 
therefore, must be substantial enough to justify such power; 
they cannot be sporadic or occasional, even though 
sporadic activities themselves might be subject to local 
regulation when they are the source of the dispute.63 
These ideas require careful consideration in today’s complex global 
economy. Justice Brennan admonishes us thusly: 
By broadening the type and amount of business 
opportunities available to participants in interstate and 
foreign commerce, our economy has increased the 
frequency with which foreign corporations actively pursue 
commercial transactions throughout the various States. In 
turn, it has become both necessary and, in my view, 
desirable to allow the States more leeway in bringing the 
activities of these nonresident corporations within the 
scope of their respective jurisdictions.64 
Echoing the fairness rationale mentioned above in the discussion on 
general jurisdiction theory, he goes on to explain that as “active participants 
in interstate and foreign commerce take advantage of the economic benefits 
and opportunities offered by the various States, it is only fair and 
                                                
 60. Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 771. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 63. Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 771. 
 64. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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reasonable to subject them to the obligations that may be imposed by those 
jurisdictions.”65 The main obligation “that a nonresident corporation should 
expect to fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly 
affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.”66 This fairness 
rationale continues to echo throughout the historical line of cases defining 
personal jurisdiction following Pennoyer. 
II. HISTORY OF GENERAL JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court’s back-and-forth with general jurisdiction is 
anything but helpful. Instead of a “coherent vision of the law of personal 
jurisdiction . . . the Court’s fact-specific, case-by-case approach has 
produced an ever-widening doctrinal morass.”67 The problem is that the 
Court’s approach has seemingly lost sight of the bedrock of personal 
jurisdiction: due process.68 This section traces the history of the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In doing so, this section’s goal is to 
help the litigator determine how to satisfy general jurisdiction under the 
Daimler standard and to help the judiciary craft a more coherent and 
simplistic general jurisdiction standard that fits within the notions of 
modern-day due process. 
A. Pennoyer v. Neff 
Where it all begins—Pennoyer v. Neff.69 In many ways, Pennoyer 
is still the flagship case for personal jurisdiction, even if it is not the leading 
case for personal jurisdiction analysis today.70 Most importantly, in 
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court tied personal jurisdiction to the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 The Court famously established 
this principle: 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may 
be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State 
resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice 
                                                
 65. Id. at 423. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Grossi, supra note 16, at 618. 
 68. Id. at 619. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 69. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 70. Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear & Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme 
Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865, 869–70 (2013). Blanchard’s article provides a 
succinct and helpful exposition of a history of personal jurisdiction. 
 71. Id. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
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to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties 
over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute 
due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be 
experienced in giving to those terms a definition which will 
embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting 
private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can 
be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial 
proceedings.72 
Later opinions of the Court use this due-process rationale to intuit 
the substantive criteria of personal jurisdiction.73 The facts and holding of 
Pennoyer are not nearly as important as its catalytic nature. The territorial 
approach of the Pennoyer Court in 1877 was eventually replaced by the 
contacts theory of personal jurisdiction laid down by Justice Stone in 
International Shoe. But the link between personal jurisdiction and due 
process is extremely important for the development of personal jurisdiction 
as a whole, and more distinctly, the evolution of general jurisdiction. 
B. International Shoe 
When International Shoe came onto the scene of personal 
jurisdiction, the entire field was redesigned. An entirely new doctrine of 
personal jurisdiction emerged; what was once governed by territoriality is 
now governed by minimum contacts and reasonableness. 
International Shoe Company operated a nationwide business selling 
shoes and other footwear.74 It was a Delaware corporation with its principal 
place of business in Missouri.75 It employed about a dozen salesmen that 
peddled footwear in Washington.76 The issue before the lower courts, and 
ultimately the Supreme Court, was whether Washington could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the corporation and thus subject it to state taxes.77 
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Washington could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the parent company, International Shoe, in 
Missouri.78 
The Court laid down the still-current foundation of personal 
jurisdiction: 
                                                
 72. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
 73. Blanchard, supra note 70, at 870. 
 74. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 314. 
 78. Id. at 322. 
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Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in 
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the 
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the 
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its 
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now 
that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal 
service of summons or other form of notice, due process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts 
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”79 
This is the core holding of International Shoe that has survived 
numerous iterations of personal jurisdiction rules.80 
Notably, the Court’s discussion of corporations and personal 
jurisdiction is of great import here.81 For instance, the Court claimed that 
because “the corporate personality is a fiction,” personal jurisdiction over 
corporations relies on the law of agency—“the state of its origin can be 
manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are 
authorized to act for it.”82 Much of the Court’s opinion on this matter laid 
the groundwork for the doctrine of general jurisdiction.83 This dicta led to 
the conclusion that when a corporation conducts activities in a state and 
enjoys its attendant protections, obligations may arise, such as requiring the 
corporation to answer a lawsuit in that state.84 From this language, the 
                                                
 79. Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 80. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (“The canonical opinion 
in this area remains International Shoe . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918-19 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 81. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
 82. Id. 
 83. E.g., id. at 317 (“Presence in the state in this sense has never been doubted when 
the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also 
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an 
agent to accept service of process has been given.”); id. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances 
in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and 
of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.”); id. at 319 (“Whether due process is satisfied must depend 
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly 
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”). 
 84. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
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Court has crafted the doctrine of general jurisdiction over the last three-
quarters of a century. Unfortunately, the Court has not remained entirely 
consistent with this original idea, crafted in the mid-twentieth century, 
regarding the interplay of corporate structure and personal jurisdiction. 
C. Perkins 
It is here, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,85 that the 
doctrine of general jurisdiction began to take shape (or at least the shape it 
has more-or-less kept for the last 60 years). The defendant in this case, like 
International Shoe, was a corporation.86 The company operated mining 
properties in the Philippines, but during its occupation by the Japanese, the 
president of the corporation returned home to Ohio, where he continued to 
essentially direct the company.87 He cashed checks, held directors’ 
meetings, and supervised policies of the corporation.88 The Supreme Court 
found that the defendant “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic 
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.”89 
It ultimately held that the corporation was thus subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Ohio.90 
In reaching this decision, the Court first dealt with the agency 
problem—only the president of the company was in Ohio.91 On this issue, 
the Court held: 
[I]f an authorized representative of a foreign corporation be 
physically present in the state of the forum and be there 
engaged in activities appropriate to accepting service or 
receiving notice on its behalf [then] there is no unfairness 
in subjecting that corporation to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of that state through such service of process upon 
that representative.92 
Second, and more importantly, the Court clarified the doctrine of 
general jurisdiction. For a corporation to be subjected to general jurisdiction 
in a state in which it is not incorporated, the “amount and kind of activities 
which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the 
                                                
 85. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 86. Id. at 438. 
 87. Id. at 447–48. 
 88. Id. at 448. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 449. 
 91. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952). 
 92. Id. 
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forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the 
jurisdiction of the state are to be determined in each case.”93 Those kinds of 
activities must be “continuous and systematic,” such as: (1) directors’ 
meetings, (2) business correspondence, (3) banking, (4) stock transfers, 
(5) payment of salaries, and (6) purchasing of machinery.94 Not 
surprisingly, all of these activities were the exact activities performed by 
the president of Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. 
Because the Court found that the corporation’s activities were 
continuous and systematic, the corporation was subject to suit in Ohio for 
acts that were unrelated to the suit’s underlying dispute.95 Unfortunately for 
proponents of an expansive theory of general jurisdiction, this is the only 
U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court has found the activities of a 
corporation to be of such a continuous and systematic nature as to justify 
the exercise of general jurisdiction.96 
D. Helicopteros 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall was the 
Supreme Court’s first significant general jurisdiction case after Perkins.97 
With this case, the Court began the trend toward narrowing the scope of 
general jurisdiction.98 Here, the defendant (Helicopteros, or Helicol) was a 
Columbian corporation with its principal place of business in Columbia.99 
The facts giving rise to the lawsuit involved a helicopter crash in Peru in 
which the lives of four American citizens were claimed.100 Their survivors 
and decedents brought suit and attempted to hale the defendant, Helicol, 
into court in Texas.101 
Here, Helicol’s contacts with Texas were not connected to the 
subject of the suit, so the plaintiffs turned to general jurisdiction—which 
the Court ultimately rejected.102 The Court first reiterated the holding of 
Perkins, namely that “due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting 
the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient 
                                                
 93. Id. at 445. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 448-49. 
 96. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 97. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 409. 
 100. Id. at 409–10. 
 101. Id. at 410. 
 102. Id. at 418. 
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contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”103 The Court 
summarized Helicol’s relevant contacts with Texas this way: 
It is undisputed that Helicol does not have a place of 
business in Texas and never has been licensed to do 
business in the State. Basically, Helicol’s contacts with 
Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to 
Houston for a contract-negotiating session; accepting into 
its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston 
bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment and training 
services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; and 
sending personnel to Bell’s facilities in Fort Worth for 
training.104 
The Court concluded that the contacts here were less significant 
than those in Perkins, so the plaintiffs could not rely on general jurisdiction 
as their personal jurisdiction theory.105 
The Court then took an interesting turn. It dismissed as 
insignificant the contacts between the purchases of equipment and related 
training trips.106 But it did so based on the holding of a pre-International 
Shoe opinion, which found that purchases and related trips were not enough 
“for a State’s assertion of jurisdiction.”107 Nonetheless, the Court imported 
this holding from Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.: “[M]ere 
purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a 
State’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation 
in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions.”108 
Writing alone, Justice Brennan took a contrary position.109 He was 
wary of the court’s citing of the Rosenberg Bros. case to establish the 
constitutional boundaries of due process as evidenced in general 
jurisdiction.110 Brennan would have held that the undisputed contacts in this 
case were sufficient to satisfy general jurisdiction—“Helicol has 
                                                
 103. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 104. Id. at 416. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 417. Notably, the Texas Supreme Court found these contacts to be 
dispositive of the general jurisdiction issue. Id. 
 107. Id. The Court looks to the case of Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 
260 U.S. 516 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). Although the case may be important in the balance of the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, it is odd indeed to rely on such a short, 
undetailed opinion from the Pennoyer era of personal jurisdiction. Cf. Helicopteros, 
466 U.S. at 419–20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 108. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418. 
 109. Id. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 420. 
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purposefully availed itself of the benefits and obligations of the forum.”111 
He then began to poke holes in the majority’s arguments.112 
First, Justice Brennan explained he did not read Perkins to establish 
the “necessary minimum” that a corporation’s contacts must reach before it 
may be subject to general jurisdiction.113 Brennan reasoned that the “vast 
expansion of our national economy during the past several decades has 
provided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible reach of a 
State’s jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”114 He went on to explain 
his rationale:  
[T]his trend toward expanding the permissible scope of 
state jurisdiction over foreign corporation and other 
nonresidents is entirely consistent with the traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice that control our 
inquiry under the Due Process Clause. As active 
participants in interstate and foreign commerce take 
advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities 
offered by the various States, it is only fair and reasonable 
to subject them to the obligations that may be imposed by 
those jurisdictions. And chief among the obligations that a 
nonresident corporation should expect to fulfill is 
amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly 
affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.115 
Although this may seem incongruent with the concept of 
“minimum contacts,” it is not incongruent with the doctrine of “fair play 
and substantial justice.”116 The modern interpretation of specific jurisdiction 
by the Court is rightly linked to the doctrine of minimum contacts.117 But 
this is not so with general jurisdiction.118 International Shoe made clear that 
when corporations take advantage of the benefits of a state, they might also 
incur reciprocal obligations.119 Justice Brennan’s iteration of general 
jurisdiction is entirely consistent with the Court’s holding in International 
Shoe.120 If the ultimate question is fairness to the defendant, it makes little 
                                                
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 420–28. 
 113. Id. at 421. 
 114. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984). 
 115. Id. at 423. 
 116. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 117. See Grossi, supra note 16, at 622–24. 
 118. Id. at 623. 
 119. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318–20. 
 120. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419–427 
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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sense that the decision of whether to exercise general jurisdiction lies with 
the Court on an ad hoc basis.121 Leaving foreign corporations at the mercy 
of the Court’s fact-finding and balancing seems inconsistent with 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”122 
Justice Brennan’s idea is much more understandable in light of the due 
process heart of personal jurisdiction.123 
E. Goodyear 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown arises from a 
bus accident in France that claimed the lives of two 13-year-old boys from 
North Carolina.124 The plaintiff–parents of the two boys filed suit in North 
Carolina state court against Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation, as well as 
three of Goodyear USA’s indirect subsidiaries in Luxembourg, Turkey, and 
France, each of which disputed the North Carolina court’s personal 
jurisdiction over them.125 Notably, these subsidiaries were “not registered to 
do business in North Carolina.”126 Furthermore, they had “no place of 
business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.”127 Finally, even 
though a small percentage of their tires were distributed with the state by 
other Goodyear affiliates, the subsidiaries did “not design, manufacture, or 
advertise their products in North Carolina . . . [and did] not solicit business 
in North Carolina.”128 
Led by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that those connections with 
North Carolina were insufficient to warrant an exercise of general 
jurisdiction by North Carolina state courts.129 Even under the form of 
general jurisdiction this note proposes, these contacts are likely not within 
the gambit of activities that would warrant a reasonable extension of 
general jurisdiction. What is disconcerting about this opinion is not the 
holding, but the rule that emerges.130 The Court here exclaims that 
                                                
 121. Id. at 427 (“Our interpretation of the Due Process Clause has never been so 
dependent upon the applicable substantive law or the State’s formal pleading 
requirements.”). 
 122. Id. (“[T]he principal focus when determining whether a forum may 
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant has been on fairness and 
reasonableness to the defendant.”). 
 123. See id. at 419–27. 
 124. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011). 
 125. Id. at 919–21. Goodyear USA did not dispute the North Carolina court’s 
jurisdiction over it. Id. at 919.  
 126. Id. at 921. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 930–31. 
 130. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011). 
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jurisdiction “could be asserted where the corporation’s in-state activity is 
‘continuous and systematic’ and that activity gave rise to the episode-in-
suit.”131 This is systematically concerning. It appears that Justice Ginsburg 
here is mixing elements of specific jurisdiction with elements of personal 
jurisdiction. 
Purportedly, International Shoe stands for the proposition that the 
activities of a defendant can be significant enough to satisfy general 
jurisdiction even if the contacts are unrelated to the instant suit.132 In no 
uncertain terms, the International Shoe Court explains: “there have been 
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were 
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 
activities.”133 This distinction seems to escape the Court’s opinion in 
Goodyear. 
While the Court incorporates both Perkins and Helicopteros, it still 
finds that the defendant’s contacts with North Carolina are not continuous 
and substantial enough to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.134 
Like in Helicopteros, the Court simply groups the factual scenarios from 
prior general jurisdiction cases together and measures the contacts in the 
present case against them.135 
In finding that the defendant’s contacts did not satisfy general 
jurisdiction, the Court, rather slyly, states a new rule for general jurisdiction 
that will carry over into Daimler.136 Citing International Shoe, von Mehren, 
Trautman, and Brilmayer, the Court provides the current jurisdictional rule: 
A court may assert general jurisdiction (sister-state or 
foreign-country) over corporations to hear any and all 
claims against them when their affiliations with the State 
are so “continuous and systematic” as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction, 
on the other hand, depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the 
forum and the underlying controversy,” principally, activity 
                                                
 131. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 132. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
 133. Id. (emphasis added). While Justice Ginsburg quotes a relevant section of 
International Shoe in saying that “continuous activity of some sorts” will not be enough to 
require those defendants to be amenable to suit in that State, Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 927 
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318), she arguably still moves general jurisdiction to a much 
less significant place than the International Shoe court intended. 
 134. Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 930. 
 135. Id. at 929 (“Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is not a 
forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.”). 
 136. Id. at 919–20. 
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or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.137 
Although this standard is the current rule that plaintiffs must 
satisfy, the phrase “essentially at home in the forum state” is not found in 
any prior general jurisdiction cases.138 For better or worse, plaintiffs must 
now plead enough jurisdictional facts to satisfy the Court’s current 
understanding of being “essentially at home.” 
III. DAIMLER 
On January 14, 2014, the Supreme Court decided its fourth general 
jurisdiction case, adding to the limited body of case law governing an 
important doctrine.139 Several citizens of Argentina sued Daimler AG in a 
California federal court looking to recover under the Alien Tort Statute.140 
The plaintiffs claimed that Daimler, through its Argentinian subsidiary, 
“collaborated with the Argentinian government to detain, torture, and kill 
some of the subsidiary’s employees.”141 Although quite complicated, at 
heart, the plaintiffs alleged that jurisdiction was proper due to the California 
contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), another Daimler 
subsidiary.142 Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and, in 
another opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, further narrowed the scope 
of general jurisdiction.143 The following four sections explore the most 
pertinent portions of this case’s procedural history: (A) the original 
proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California; 
(B) the appeal and subsequent en banc review in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit; (C) the authoritative opinion of the U.S. Supreme 
Court; and (D) the compelling concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. 
                                                
 137. Id. at 919 (emphasis added). 
 138. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 ; 
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 
(1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 139. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746. See Cam Barker et al., U.S. Supreme Ct. Update, 26 APP. 
ADVOC. 436, 443–45 (2014); Elizabeth M. Weldon & Marjorie A. Witter, Keeping Current, 
2014-MAY BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2014). 
 140. Barker, supra note 139, at 443. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 444. 
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A. Northern District of California 
In Bauman v. Daimlerchrysler AG, one Chilean citizen and 
22 Argentinian citizens filed suit against a host of corporations, both 
foreign and domestic, alleging that Mercedes-Benz Argentina collaborated 
with the Argentinian government to kidnap and torture the plaintiffs and the 
plaintiffs’ relatives during the Dirty War of 1976–1983.144 The multiple 
corporate defendants (and their attendant corporate structures) are very 
confusing, but necessary to understand because agency is important for 
establishing general jurisdiction over corporate defendants. At root, the 
plaintiffs alleged that because DaimlerChrysler Argentina (DCA; and 
formerly known as Mercedes-Benz Argentina) is “either a division or 
wholly owned subsidiary of” DaimlerChrisler AG (DCAG), then DCAG is 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of California via agency.145 DCAG 
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.146 The district court 
tentatively granted the motion,147 and then later solidified the order and 
dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over DCAG.148 
The district court then delved into an extremely detailed analysis of 
the defendants’ personal jurisdiction argument.149 It laid out a two-part test 
adapted from Helicopteros: “(1) whether defendant has systematic and 
continuous contacts with California; and (2) whether the assertion of 
general jurisdiction is reasonable.”150 Before proceeding, the court 
recognized the difficulty of its inquiry: 
This case presents a difficult question: can a federal court 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a case arising under 
federal subject matter jurisdiction in which plaintiffs are all 
foreign nationals and the defendant is a foreign corporation 
which has subsidiaries doing business in the United 
States?151 
Under then-current Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, the plaintiff had to 
establish that the defendant had been “conducting business in California, 
                                                
 144. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31929, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (Order Tentatively Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss). 
 145. Id. at *3–4. 
 146. Id. at *1–3. 
 147. Id. at *61. 
 148. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2007 WL 486389, 
at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss). 
 149. Bauman, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31929, at *10–61. 
 150. Id. at *10. 
 151. Id. at *11. 
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not merely with California.”152 The district court then lays out its 
framework for determining “systematic and continuous contacts”: 
First, [courts] seek to determine whether there is “some 
kind of deliberate physical presence” in the forum state, 
including physical facilities, bank accounts, agents, 
registration, or incorporation. . . . Second, courts “look at 
whether the company has engaged in active solicitation 
toward and participation in the state’s markets, i.e., the 
economic reality of the defendant’s activities in the 
state.”153 
The court analyzed the nine different contacts that the plaintiffs 
alleged the defendant had with the state of California.154 It concluded that 
five of these nine contacts were not attributable to DCAG but rather to its 
subsidiaries.155 Thus, these contacts were “not properly considered direct 
contacts of DCAG to California.”156 The remaining four contacts were 
found to be “direct” contacts with California, but they were not enough to 
satisfy this first prong of general jurisdiction—systematic and continuous 
contacts.157 
The plaintiffs also alleged that DCAG had sufficient contacts with 
California due to the agency relationship between itself and its subsidiaries, 
specifically MBUSA.158 It alleged the following contacts: (1) “MBUSA has 
its principal place of business in New Jersey and is wholly-owned by 
DaimlerChrysler North America Holding Company, a Delaware 
corporation[,]” (2) MBUSA serves the U.S. as DCAG’s “exclusive 
Mercedes-Benz importer and sales agent,” (3) “MBUSA is the single 
largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California car market,” and 
(4) MBUSA maintains an office and Vehicle Preparation Center in 
California.159 The plaintiffs posited that these contacts created an agency 
relationship that could impute the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent 
company.160 
                                                
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at *13. 
 154. Id. at *17–31. 
 155. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31929, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *30–31. 
 158. Id. at *31. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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In the Ninth Circuit, a court may impute a subsidiary’s contacts to 
its parent when the “subsidiary is the parent’s alter ego or where the 
subsidiary acts as the general agent of the parent.”161 These tests are 
different and either may be used to impute a subsidiary’s contacts to a 
parent for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 
To establish that the subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent 
corporation, the plaintiffs must make out a prima facie case 
(1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer 
exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate 
identities] would result in fraud or injustice.162 
The agency test is related, but not identical. 
To satisfy the agency test, plaintiffs must make a prima 
facie showing that the subsidiary represents the parent 
corporation by performing services sufficiently important 
to the [parent] corporation that if it did not have a 
representative to perform them, the [parent] corporation 
would undertake to perform similar services. The agency 
test permits the imputation of contacts where the subsidiary 
was either established for, or is engaged in, activities that, 
but for the existence of the subsidiary, the parent would 
have to undertake.163 
It seems that the plaintiffs’ evidence would clearly meet either of 
these tests, thus allowing the five MBUSA contacts to be imputed to 
DCAG. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs did not argue the alter ego test.164 But 
regarding the agency test, the district court found that, on balance, the 
plaintiffs provided no evidence that DCAG exercised operational control 
over MBUSA.165 
                                                
 161. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31929, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at *33. 
 163. Id. at *34 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court also identified 
several factors that may be considered in making a determination as to whether a 
subsidiary’s contacts satisfy the agency test: “(1) what percentage of the parent corporation’s 
business comes from the subsidiary; (2) whether the parent corporation’s only agent in the 
United States is the subsidiary; and (3) whether the parent corporation conducts marketing 
activities in the United States.” Id. at *34. 
 164. Id. at *33. 
 165. Id. at *36. 
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The district court then proceeded to conduct an excruciatingly 
detailed analysis of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be 
reasonable.166 It is unclear why the court did this, because it had already 
found the first prong of the general jurisdiction test was not met.167 
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this 
case would violate the defendant’s due process rights.168 
B. Ninth Circuit 
1. Three-Judge Panel Decision 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court,169 over the 
strong dissent of Judge Reinhardt,170 who eventually wrote the en banc 
decision reversing the three-judge panel.171 The Ninth Circuit began its 
analysis by noting what was implicit in the district court’s opinion: that the 
“existence of a relationship between a parent company and its subsidiaries” 
is not enough.172 What the Ninth Circuit went on to parse, however, is the 
distinction between a parent–subsidiary relationship and a holding 
company–subsidiary relationship.173 The court concluded that subsidiaries 
do not conduct business as agents when the “business of the parent is the 
business of investment.”174 It then defined the facts needed to prove the 
existence of a requisite agency relationship: “monitoring of the subsidiary’s 
performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s finance and capital budget 
decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures.”175 The Ninth 
Circuit also clarified the agency test in that circuit: 
First, the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and 
continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or 
instrumentality of the parent, notwithstanding the 
maintenance of corporate formalities. Control must be over 
                                                
 166. Id. at *38–61. 
 167. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194–RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31929, at *29–31 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 168. See Bauman, 2007 WL 486389, at *6–7 (holding that jurisdictional discovery did 
not produce any significant evidence to change the court’s mind on declining to extend 
personal jurisdiction). 
 169. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 1098–1106 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 171. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Reinhardt, J., for the majority). 
 172. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1094. 
 173. Id. at 1095. 
 174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175. Id. 
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and above that to be expected as an incident of ownership. 
Second, the agent-subsidiary must also be sufficiently 
important to the parent corporation that if it did not have a 
representative, the parent corporation would undertake to 
perform substantially similar services.176 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the jurisdictional facts did not 
establish “pervasive and continual control.”177 Although the court found 
that the question was close, there was no “prima facie showing that DCAG 
would undertake to perform substantially similar services in the absence of 
MBUSA.”178 
In his dissent, Judge Reinhardt formulated the argument that would 
eventually prevail at the en banc level.179 Specifically, he argued that the 
new test required a “much stronger relationship between parent and 
subsidiary than is necessary or desirable,” and that the result would be “to 
shield foreign corporations from actions in American courts—although they 
have structured their affairs so as to reap vast profits from American 
markets—and to deprive plaintiffs, including those who allege grave human 
rights abuses, of access to justice.”180 
Judge Reinhardt then chipped away at the majority’s exceedingly 
stringent test. After quoting the same rule as the majority,181 he found that 
the “principal focus of the agency test for purposes of general 
jurisdiction . . . is not ‘control’—much less ‘pervasive and continual’ 
control—but rather the relative importance of the services provided to the 
parent corporation.”182 In Reinhardt’s view, the majority essentially 
conflated the two tests which now, in practice, requires plaintiffs to meet 
the more stringent alter ego test.183 
The important takeaway from Judge Reinhardt’s dissent is that the 
court was “establishing a test for agency in a specialized context.”184 As he 
explained: 
                                                
 176. Id. at 1095. 
 177. Id. at 1096. 
 178. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). Also, 
unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit did not get to the issue of reasonableness because 
there were not continuous and systematic contacts. Id. at 1097. 
 179. Id. at 1098–1106 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 1098. 
 181. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 182. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1098 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). Notably, the actual text of the agency test requires a “showing that the subsidiary 
functions as the parent corporation’s representative in that it performs services that are 
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation . . . .” Id. (quoting Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928). 
 183. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1099. 
 184. Id. at 1100. 
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We are deciding one question only: whether DCAG has 
sufficient minimum contacts with [the forum state] such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, our tests 
for agency and alter ego when the issue is jurisdictional are 
merely shorthand devices for defining what constitutes 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for 
purposes of the due process analysis of International Shoe 
based upon the parent-subsidiary relationship.185 
Here, Judge Reinhardt is absolutely correct. Personal jurisdiction, 
as a threshold issue, should not require the specificity of vicarious liability 
or a “scope of employment” determination. The purpose of general 
jurisdiction is to get the defendant (usually a corporate one) into the 
courtroom. If the issue were one of, say, whether to pierce the corporate 
veil, then the majority’s test may well be appropriate. But in a situation like 
this, such a stringent test defeats the purposes of general jurisdiction.186 
What is exceedingly frustrating about this case is that both parties 
agreed that “MBUSA’s contacts with California warrant the exercise of 
general jurisdiction.”187 The only hiccup in haling DCAG into court is the 
majority’s overly exacting agency test for general jurisdiction. Judge 
Reinhardt quoted Judge Weinstein, and the quotation is apt: 
To any layman it would seem absurd that our courts could 
not obtain jurisdiction over a billion dollar multinational 
which is exploiting the critical New York and American 
markets to keep its home production going at a huge 
volume and profit. This perception must have a bearing on 
our evaluation of fairness. The law ignores the common 
sense of a situation at the peril of becoming irrelevant as an 
institution.188 
Reinhardt concluded by pointing to the obvious: it would seem 
strange to an ordinary California citizen, who sees Mercedes-Benz vehicles 
                                                
 185. Id. at 1100 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 186. It is worth noting here that Judge Reinhardt listed (with much more detail than the 
majority) a host of ways in which DCAG exerts control over MBUSA. See id. at 1101. In his 
view, such control satisfies even the majority’s more stringent analysis. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1102. 
 188. Id. at 1103 (quoting Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 
1322, 1327 (Weinstein, C.J.)). 
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constantly on the street, that the ultimate financial owner of Mercedes-Benz 
cannot be haled into court in California.189 
2. Panel Rehearing 
The panel rehearing was the best news that the plaintiffs had during 
the entirety of this litigation. It may have been their only favorable ruling. 
At the outset, Judge Reinhardt set the tone of the opinion by bringing up the 
point that the district court “did not hold an evidentiary hearing when it 
ruled on DCAG’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”190 
Citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., he clarified that “the plaintiffs ‘need only 
demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the 
defendant.’”191 
Although it is apparent which side Judge Reinhardt was on in 
writing this opinion, frankly, it is a nice change of pace. Writing for the 
Ninth Circuit Panel, Judge Reinhardt first discussed the vast amount of 
revenue that DCAG received through its subsidiaries in the United States, 
especially its sales of Mercedes-Benz automobiles.192 Next, the court, in 
some detail, delved into the General Distributor Agreement between DCAG 
and MBUSA that, in the words of the court, “establishe[d] extensive 
requirements for MBUSA as the general distributor.”193 
Although repetition of the court’s findings is not needed here, an 
overview of the components of the agreement bears mentioning. For 
example, DCAG exercised some level of control over the following aspects 
of its subsidiaries: sales objectives and network, dealership standards, 
business systems (accounting, inventory, etc.), collection of customer 
information, management personnel requirements, vehicle service 
standards, warranty terms, technical service publications, advertising 
standards, signage, prices, change in corporate formation, working capital, 
customer satisfaction policies, trademark ownership, and ability to contract 
with third parties.194 These facts ended up being dispositive for the court 
upon reconsideration. 
Since a court of appeals may review a lack of personal jurisdiction 
under the de novo standard, it may re-weigh the facts, testimony, record, 
and legal standards without deference to the district court’s findings or legal 
                                                
 189. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1103. Judge Reinhardt continued by finding that exercising 
personal jurisdiction in this case comports with the reasonableness factors. Id. at 1103–06. 
 190. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2011) (rehearing). 
 191. Id. (citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). 
 192. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 913–14. 
 193. Id. at 914. 
 194. Id. at 914–17. 
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conclusions.195 After considering the facts, the court, on appeal, comes out 
the other way from the district court. It is important to note here that the 
plaintiffs’ facts must be taken as true because the district court did not hold 
an evidentiary hearing.196 
First, the court concluded that MBUSA has requisite contacts with 
California.197 In fact, both parties agreed that California courts might 
lawfully exercise general jurisdiction over MBUSA.198 Therefore, the court 
appropriately framed the question as “whether MBUSA’s extensive 
contacts with California warrant[ed] the exercise of general jurisdiction 
over DCAG.”199 
Second, just like the Ninth Circuit in its revoked opinion, and the 
district court before that, the two parent–subsidiary tests were in the 
limelight. What Judge Reinhardt made clear is that the alter ego test is 
conclusively about control, whereas the agency test is about the importance 
of the subsidiary’s services to the parent company.200 In this light, Judge 
Reinhardt framed the question thusly: 
For the agency test, we ask: Are the services provided by 
MBUSA sufficiently important to DCAG that, if MBUSA 
went out of business, DCAG would continue selling cars in 
this vast market either by selling them itself, or 
alternatively by selling them through a new representative? 
We answer this question in the affirmative.201 
This test essentially asks whether the subsidiary is performing a 
service that the parent would perform itself in the subsidiary’s absence. As 
interesting as this sounds, such a question gets to the heart of this general 
jurisdiction battle and the frustration of Judge Reinhardt (and later 
Justice Sotomayor). The vast and intricate legal structure of a corporation, 
which is a legal fiction, should not make it impossible for that company to 
be haled into court simply because it sends an agent to do its work. The 
deep pocket (here, DCAG) truly lies at the top of this parent-subsidiary 
structure. If a wronged plaintiff cannot reach the legal person who allegedly 
financed and oversaw the company that tortured and killed the plaintiffs 
                                                
 195. See id. at 919 (discussing the standard of review) (citing Butcher’s Union Local 
No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 196. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 913. 
 197. Id. at 920. 
 198. Id. at 920 n.11. 
 199. Id. at 920. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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and their decedents, then there must be a serious gap in the legal system. 
Judge Reinhardt identified such a gap here. 
The court found that “MBUSA’s services were sufficiently 
important to DCAG and . . . DCAG had the right to substantially control 
MBUSA’s activities,” and therefore, MBUSA was DCAG’s agent.202 After 
this finding, the burden was on the defendant to show that an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable.203 Weighing the 
reasonableness factors, the court determined that DCAG had not carried 
this burden.204 In summary, the court stated: “[W]e conclude that it is 
reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over DCAG in California, a state that has 
itself become a major hub for world commerce and attracts business not 
only from all over Europe, but from all over Asia as well.”205 
C. Supreme Court 
As often happens, everything changes at the Supreme Court. The 
careful distinctions between the agency and alter ego theories are of no 
moment because the Court, per Justice Ginsburg, held that general 
jurisdiction covers an extremely narrow set of circumstances, and this is not 
one.206 What is remarkable about this holding is that the Court assumes that 
all nine of the contacts outlined in the district court’s opinion qualify as 
such for personal jurisdiction purposes, and yet, these contacts are still 
insufficient for general jurisdiction.207 
                                                
 202. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (rehearing). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. The seven factors considered are:  
 
[T]he extent of purposeful interjection; the burden on the defendant; the 
extent of conflict with sovereignty of the defendant’s state; the forum 
sate’s interest in adjudicating the suit; the most efficient judicial 
resolution of the dispute; the convenience and effectiveness of relief for 
the plaintiff; and the existence of an alternative forum.  
Id. at 925. 
 205. Id. at 930. In concluding, the court cited Burger King v. Rudcewiecz for the 
proposition that “the Supreme Court ‘long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction 
might turn on “mechanical” tests’ that failed to take account of reality.” Id. (quoting Burger 
King v. Rudcewiecz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1985)). 
 206. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“Even if we were to assume 
that MBUSA is at home in California, and further to assume that MBUSA’s contacts are 
imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction 
in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.”). 
 207. Such a conclusion is ironic because this is a much different ground than the one 
relied on by the district court or the Ninth Circuit in its first opinion. The district court 
granted the motion to dismiss because it found that only three of the nine contacts were 
imputable to DCAG, and that they were not enough for personal jurisdiction. Likewise, the 
Ninth Circuit, in its first opinion, found that the motion to dismiss was proper because all 
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The Court first thoroughly recited the facts208 and procedural 
history209 and efficiently outlined the histories of personal jurisdiction210 
and general jurisdiction.211 Justice Ginsburg then recognized that Professors 
von Mehren and Trautman were correct in their prediction: Specific 
jurisdiction has played a central role in determining personal jurisdiction 
and general jurisdiction has taken a back seat.212 The Court then 
summarized its general jurisdiction jurisprudence: 
International Shoe distinguished between, on the one hand, 
exercises of specific jurisdiction, as just described, and on 
the other, situations where a foreign corporation’s 
continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it 
on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities. As we have since explained, [a] court 
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or 
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims 
against them when their affiliations with the State are so 
continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum state.213 
Because the Court found that “general jurisdiction has come to 
occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary scheme,” it declined to 
stretch general jurisdiction beyond its traditionally recognized limits.214 
Thus, the culmination of Pennoyer, International Shoe, Perkins, 
Helicopteros, Goodyear, and Daimler resulted in this rule: For a defendant 
to be subject to a court’s general jurisdiction, he must be “essentially at 
home in the forum state.” This is a far cry from the principles of Perkins, 
where “continuous corporate operations within a state” justified suit against 
the corporation “on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
                                                                                                             
nine contacts could not be attributed to DCAG. Here, the Court looks past that, imputes all 
nine contacts to DCAG, and still finds insufficient connection to California. 
 208. Id. at 751–52. 
 209. Id. at 752–53. 
 210. Id. at 753–54. 
 211. Id. at 754–58 (discussing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 
(1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); and Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
 212. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755–56. 
 213. Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 
at 919; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n.9). 
 214. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58. 
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from those activities.”215 A corporation can only have a few true homes: its 
place of incorporation and its principle place of business. It does not appear 
that the Court would find general jurisdiction even on the facts of Perkins 
in today’s jurisdictional world. 
The Court next turned to the Ninth Circuit’s agency theory for 
imputing contacts from MBUSA to DCAG.216 It gave the theory little 
consideration, however, reasoning: 
Even if [it] were to assume MBUSA is at home in 
California, and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are 
imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to 
subject [DCAG] to general jurisdiction in California, for 
[DCAG’s] slim contacts with the State hardly render it at 
home there.217 
The Court declined to look beyond the forum where a corporation 
is “incorporated or has its principal place of business” to a “State in which a 
corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of 
business.’”218 The Court found that formulation “unacceptably grasping.”219 
This is a little bit shocking. Although Justice Ginsburg recognized the 
general jurisdiction avenue laid down in International Shoe,220 the Court 
circled back to the idea of being “essentially at home in the forum state.”221 
When the Court found that DCAG was not at home in California through its 
agent of MBUSA, it reversed the Ninth Circuit and found the case wanting 
of personal jurisdiction.222 
                                                
 215. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446. 
 216. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759. 
 217. Id. at 760. 
 218. Id. at 760–61. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 761 (“Turning to all-purpose jurisdiction, in contrast, International Shoe 
speaks of ‘instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so 
substantial and of such a nature to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
318 (1945)) (italics in original). 
 221. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 919). Interestingly, 
here, Justice Ginsburg relies on an article by Professor Twitchell for the proposition that 
general jurisdiction does not simply exist “wherever continuous and systematic contacts are 
found.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (citing Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business 
with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 184 (2001)). 
 222. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763. 
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D. Sotomayor Concurrence 
Justice Sotomayor alone disagreed with the Court’s analysis of 
personal jurisdiction.223 She recognized the core of the majority’s problem: 
“In recent years, Americans have grown accustomed to the concept of 
multinational corporations that are supposedly ‘too big to fail’; today the 
Court deems Daimler ‘too big for general jurisdiction.’”224 
Justice Sotomayor eloquently expressed her concern as follows: 
As to substance, the Court’s focus on Daimler’s operations 
outside of California ignores the lodestar of our personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence: A State may subject a defendant 
to the burden of suit if the defendant has sufficiently taken 
advantage of the State’s laws and protections through its 
contacts in the State; whether the defendant has contacts 
elsewhere is immaterial.225 
She then began her analysis and critique of the majority 
opinion. First, although the lower courts use a reasonableness prong when 
analyzing general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has never required such 
analysis, and it does not do so in this opinion.226 But, since Bauman never 
argued against the use of the reasonableness prong, it should be considered 
in this case and left open to decide in future cases.227 Because Bauman 
failed to show that it was more reasonably convenient to litigate in 
California, Justice Sotomayor ultimately agreed with the majority’s 
outcome.228 However, since the parties were not asked to brief or orally 
argue whether it was reasonable to litigate in California, Justice Sotomayor 
criticized the Court’s fact-intensive analysis on that issue.229 
Second, Justice Sotomayor raised the argument that the facts in this 
case were almost analogous to Perkins.230 She argued that if full briefing 
had been done on the issue the Court actually decided, all of the contacts 
attributed to DCAG by way of MBUSA would be enough to satisfy general 
jurisdiction.231 
                                                
 223. Id. at 763–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Despite disagreeing with the Court’s 
analysis of personal jurisdiction, Justice Sotomayor did agree with the Court’s ultimate 
result. Id. 
 224. Id. at 763. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 764–65. 
 227. Id. at 765. 
 228. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014). 
 229. Id. at 766. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
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Third, Justice Sotomayor returned to the earlier-articulated tension 
between Professors Brilmayer and Twitchell.232 She recognized that when a 
“corporation chooses to invoke the benefits and protections of a State in 
which it operates, the State acquires the authority to subject the company to 
suit in its courts.”233 This conclusion touches on the reasonableness of a 
broader general jurisdiction rule: that “there is nothing unpredictable about 
a rule that instructs multinational corporations that if they engage in 
continuous and substantial contacts with more than one State, they will be 
subject to general jurisdiction in each one.”234 Just because the 
International Shoe world did not have many corporations the size of 
Daimler does not mean that the rule laid down in that case is inapplicable 
now.235 
Finally, Justice Sotomayor recognized the “deep injustice” that the 
Daimler rule would produce.236 She gave four reasons why the modern 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence produces unfair results. First, it 
disallows states’ adjudication of corporations that have continuous and 
substantial business operations within their borders.237 Second, under this 
new rule, large corporations will escape personal jurisdiction, while smaller 
businesses will find themselves in court for the same lawsuits.238 Third, 
because transient jurisdiction still exists, the lone traveler in a state can be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of its courts, but a multinational corporation 
cannot.239 Fourth, the effect of keeping large corporations out of a state’s 
courts denies harmed individuals the just compensation they deserve.240 In 
summary, Justice Sotomayor pointed out many of the problems with the 
majority’s analysis and provided some guidance on crafting a better general 
jurisdiction rule. 
IV. SATISFYING THE DAIMLER TEST 
Like it or not, the Daimler rule is the current test. Therefore, 
plaintiffs need to know how to satisfy the current requirements of general 
jurisdiction. In order to help plaintiffs meet these requirements, this section 
covers a few topics. First, it explains what this new test actually means. 
                                                
 232. Id. at 768. 
 233. Id. Justice Sotomayor then references Professor Brilmayer for the proposition that 
the focus should solely be on the corporation’s interactions with the forum state. Id. (citing 
Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 22, at 742). 
 234. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 (2014). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 772. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 773. 
 240. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014). 
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Second, it discusses some novel methods of satisfying general jurisdiction, 
specifically focusing on lower court decisions and the use of internet 
contacts. Third, it provides a plaintiff’s checklist, which may prove helpful 
for plaintiffs attempting to use general jurisdiction to hale corporate 
defendants into court. 
A. What the Test Actually Means 
The good news for plaintiffs is that general jurisdiction still 
exists.241 The bad news for plaintiffs is that it has been essentially limited to 
the factual scenario of Perkins.242 Or, it has at least been limited to those 
situations in which the contacts in a forum state are equal to or exceed those 
in Perkins.243 According to the Court, the corporate defendant must be 
“essentially at home in the forum state.”244 
However, there is some good news for plaintiffs. Specifically, the 
Court did not reject the agency theory of imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to 
a parent corporation.245 This means that a plaintiff can use the contacts of a 
subsidiary to help pull a parent defendant into the forum state.246 
Accordingly, one will need to utilize either the agency or alter ego theory 
set forth in the Ninth Circuit opinion. 
Here is a suggestion for satisfying the current test. First, find as 
much money changing hands within a state as possible. Then find a way to 
impute those transactions to a parent corporation. Finally, list as many 
potential ways the parent company has taken advantage of the privileges of 
doing business in the forum state. Here you can also rely on the contacts of 
the subsidiary if they may be properly imputed to the parent corporation.247 
B. Wiggle Room in the Circuit/District Courts 
The next places to look for help in haling a corporate defendant into 
court under a general jurisdiction theory are (1) malleability in the standard 
                                                
 241. Although the Supreme Court has significantly narrowed the scope of general 
jurisdiction, it is still a valid jurisdictional theory. See id. at 754–55. 
 242. Id. at 755–56. 
 243. Id. 
 244. For an analysis of a specific corporation’s contacts under the new Daimler 
standard, see Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman 
& the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 233 (2014). 
 245. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758–62. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Look to Professor Brilmayer here for a much broader survey of case law 
surrounding the imputation of a subsidiary’s contacts to a parent corporation. See Lea 
Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction & Substantive Legal Relations: Corps., 
Conspiracies, & Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
2016] SALVAGING GENERAL JURISDICTION 221 
 
found by lower courts and (2) the use of internet contacts. Although the use 
of internet contacts is slightly more controversial, the use of such contacts 
is increasingly dominating the personal jurisdiction analysis in an internet-
saturated world. 
1. Interpretations of Daimler’s Requirements 
Ten federal circuits have considered Daimler’s new requirements at 
length and, for the most part, have not strayed too far from the Court’s 
directives.248 Perhaps the most restrictive is the Second Circuit. It has said 
that aside from an exceptional case, “a corporation is at home . . . only in a 
state that is the company’s formal place of incorporation or its principal 
place of business.”249 
The Fifth Circuit has also considered general jurisdiction in a post-
Daimler world. Although it did not call general jurisdiction an exceptional 
case, it recognized that it is “incredibly difficult to establish general 
jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal 
place of business.”250 The difference between the Second and Fifth Circuits 
may lie in the fact that the sheer number of corporate defendants that the 
Second Circuit encounters makes it less amenable to general jurisdiction 
from a pure efficiency rationale. Therefore, a plaintiff’s chances are better 
in the Fifth Circuit than in the Second Circuit. 
Perhaps because it was reversed in Daimler, the Ninth Circuit has 
also refused to extend general jurisdiction beyond the facts of Perkins.251 It 
has used the “exceptional case” language from Daimler to find that a 
corporation did not have the requisite contacts in California to support 
general jurisdiction.252 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit overlooked 
Justice Sotomayor’s concerns in her concurrence and found that the 
defendant corporation’s contacts in California must be compared with its 
                                                
 248. E.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Aero 
Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 249. Gucci, 768 F.3d at 134–35 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761). Other notable 
post-Daimler general jurisdiction cases are: Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 
750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 
745 F.3d 30, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 250. Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). See also In 
re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 251. E.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014).   
 252. Id. 
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worldwide contacts.253 Thus, a plaintiff’s chances for successfully arguing 
general jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit are not good. 
The most wiggle room may be found in the federal district courts. 
In Barriere v. Juluca, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida provided some insight into how a plaintiff may properly use the 
theory of general jurisdiction in a post-Daimler world.254 The court 
characterized the Daimler rule as follows: 
What is clear from Daimler is that, for a court to exercise 
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, that 
corporation must be “at home” in the forum. “At home” 
can be read to mean “instances in which the continuous 
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and 
of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action 
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 
activities.” While the Court did not expand on the specifics, 
it noted that it would be possible for a corporation to be “at 
home” in places outside of its place of incorporation or 
principal place of business.255 
The court first noted that the defendant would have been subject to 
personal jurisdiction before the Daimler decision.256 Then, it found that, 
although Daimler “limited the application of general jurisdiction,” it did not 
eliminate its application altogether.257 Ultimately, the court determined that 
Daimler did not limit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporate defendant.258 However, it should be noted that other district 
courts have come out the other way in similar factual circumstances.259 
                                                
 253. Id. (“General jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in 
their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can 
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20)). 
 254. Barriere v. Juluca, No. 12–23510–CIV, 2014 WL 652831, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 
2014). 
 255. Id. at *7. 
 256. Id. at *8. 
 257. Id. at *9. 
 258. Id. It should be noted that there are two factual differences between this case and 
Daimler. First, Florida has an extensive history of using general jurisdiction to hale parent 
corporations into court when their resort subsidiaries are responsible for injuries to patrons. 
Id. Second, unlike Daimler, the subsidiary was a co-defendant in the action, along with the 
parent company. Id. The way around Daimler could be found in haling both the parent and 
the subsidiary into court for trial. 
 259. E.g., George v. Uponor Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (D. Minn. 2013). 
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2. Internet Contacts 
“The increasing use of the internet for the transaction of business, 
especially involving the marketing and sale of goods and services, has 
raised important issues regarding the assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
foreign companies.”260 This section argues that the use of internet contacts 
can help satisfy general jurisdiction in a post-Daimler world. 
First, the use of internet contacts for purposes of general 
jurisdiction is not a new idea.261 Most law students in the last decade have 
encountered the so-called Zippo test for internet contacts.262 This test 
separates internet websites into three categories: (1) interactive websites, 
(2) passive websites, and (3) quasi-interactive websites.263 Contacts from an 
interactive website will often qualify for specific jurisdiction purposes.264 
On the other hand, contacts from a passive website will never qualify for 
specific jurisdiction purposes.265 Finally, contacts from a quasi-interactive 
website can sometimes qualify for specific jurisdiction purposes.266 Courts 
in almost every federal circuit have either used or cited the Zippo test in a 
positive manner.267 However, circuits are split on whether Zippo should 
apply in the general jurisdiction context.268 
The most helpful case in this arena is undoubtedly Gator.com Corp. 
v. L.L. Bean, Inc., from the Ninth Circuit.269 Although later dismissed as 
moot, the analysis from the Ninth Circuit has provided extremely helpful 
guidance in using internet contacts in the general jurisdiction context.270 
The court found that although there were fewer physical contacts than were 
normally required under general jurisdiction principles, the defendant’s 
“extensive marketing and sales in California, its extensive contacts with 
California vendors, and the fact that, as alleged by [the plaintiff], its website 
is clearly and deliberately structured to operate as a sophisticated virtual 
                                                
 260. Thomas A. Dickerson et al., Personal Jurisdiction & the Marketing of Goods & 
Servs. on the Internet, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2012). 
 261. Kristin Woeste, General Jurisdiction & the Internet: Sliding Too Far?, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 793, 799 (2004). 
 262. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Woeste, supra note 261, at 796 n.17. 
 268. Id. at 799 n.36 (citing Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 269. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and 
rehearing granted en banc by 366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004), dismissed as moot by 398 F.3d 
1125 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 270. Id. 
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store in California,” were sufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction 
there.271 
Although other circuits have rejected the Zippo test for general 
jurisdiction,272 some courts have adopted a compromise.273 A number of 
commentators have said that Zippo contacts could not satisfy general 
jurisdiction when the physical contacts are lacking.274 But it does not appear 
that the Supreme Court has created two categories of contacts, one for 
general, and the other for specific jurisdiction. Instead, it has required the 
following: If the defendant’s contacts are related to the underlying 
controversy, few contacts are needed; if the defendant’s contacts are 
unrelated to the underlying controversy, many contacts are needed. 
Whether or not those contacts were established via the internet is of no 
moment. 
Although it is a new area of jurisdiction jurisprudence, internet 
contacts could provide the way forward for the stringent general jurisdiction 
framework established in Daimler.275 One scholar sums up this new horizon 
of internet contacts for general jurisdiction like this: 
The test for general jurisdiction needs to be refined such 
that businesses can plan their Internet activities to reflect 
the geographical extent to which they wish to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of foreign fora. With additional clarity to 
the jurisdictional analysis, businesses can refine their e-
commerce policies to comport with the comfort level.276 
Not only do internet contacts make the general jurisdiction 
requirement easier to satisfy, but a clearer rule from the Supreme Court 
could provide both plaintiffs and corporate defendants with the appropriate 
notice as to the requisite standard. 
                                                
 271. Woeste, supra note 261, at 801–02 (quoting Gator.com Corp., 341 F.3d at 1078). 
 272. E.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital 
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 273. Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 274. See Woeste, supra note 261, at 809. 
 275. For a vibrant discussion of this topic, see the following secondary sources: Charles 
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction Over the World-Wide Web, 52 THE 
ADVOC. (TEXAS) 53 (2010); Eric C. Hawkins, General Jurisdiction & Internet Contacts: 
What Role, If Any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2371 (2006); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: the 
Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147 
(2005). See also Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154 
(W.D. Wis. 2004) (discussing the use of internet contacts in general jurisdiction). 
 276. See Woeste, supra note 261, at 815. 
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C. General Jurisdiction Plaintiff’s Checklist 
This section provides a no-nonsense checklist for a plaintiff 
attempting to satisfy the new rigorous standard of general jurisdiction in 
Daimler. When filing suit in a particular state against a foreign corporate 
defendant, use these guidelines to help in your pleading. 
(1) Is the defendant incorporated in the state of litigation? If 
so, general jurisdiction is absolutely allowed. 
(2) Is the defendant’s principal place of business in the state of 
litigation? If so, general jurisdiction is absolutely allowed.277 
(3) Does the defendant have an office, bank account, 
employees, government contracts, an agent for service of process, corporate 
meetings, a mailing address, a history of business deals, or other financial 
connection with the state of litigation? If so, attach evidence of these 
contacts (and as many as possible) to the initial pleading or to the response 
brief (in the case of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
(4) Does the defendant have a website? If so, look to the Zippo 
test to determine whether the website contacts are sufficient for personal 
jurisdiction purposes. 
(5) Are you lacking access to any of this information? If the 
defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ask for 
a hefty amount of jurisdictional discovery. This should help unearth the 
needed evidence to satisfy general jurisdiction. 
(6) Remember that, although general jurisdiction is now 
limited, it is not impossible to satisfy. All that is required is evidence of 
continuous and systematic contacts to the extent that will justify the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
V. A NEW WAY FORWARD 
No matter what side of the general jurisdiction debate one falls on, 
it is easy to see that a new formulation for general jurisdiction is needed.278 
Many of the problems that Justice Sotomayor identified in her Daimler 
concurrence are indeed arising across the corporate litigation landscape in 
this country.279 But in addition to the injustices of current general 
jurisdiction jurisprudence, the current framework is wholly inconsistent 
with the theory of general jurisdiction articulated in International Shoe.280 
                                                
 277. Here, look to the guidance of Hertz Corp. v. Friend and use the “nerve center” 
test. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–94 (2010). 
 278. See Grossi, supra note 16, at 618. 
 279. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763–73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 280. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1945). 
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This section proposes a new rule for general jurisdiction and then explains 
the foreseeable impact and justification for such a rule. 
General jurisdiction should be defined as follows: 
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
via general jurisdiction if the following elements are 
satisfied: (1) the state’s relevant long-arm statute permits 
the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the defendant’s contacts 
evidence a continuous and systematic utilization of the 
benefits and protections of the forum state to such a degree 
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
This rule accomplishes several goals. First, it requires compliance 
with a state’s long-arm statute, which admittedly is an infrequent issue. 
Second, it utilizes the contacts inquiry first established by the landmark 
decision of International Shoe.281 Third, it incorporates the reasonableness 
inquiry of “fair play and substantial justice” that is evidenced in all personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence.282 Fourth, it focuses on the extent of the 
defendant’s use of the benefits and protections of the forum state. The 
thinking goes that if a defendant is going to take advantage of a state’s 
amenities and opportunities, it is only fair that such a defendant be subject 
to suit in the courts of that state. This is called reciprocal fairness. 
Such a rule is supported by several concerns voiced in academia 
and case law regarding properly formulated personal jurisdiction principles. 
This rule does not ignore the costs associated with a defendant litigating in 
a foreign forum; rather, the fairness rationale picks up this consideration 
and includes it in the court’s analysis.283 Furthermore, this test focuses the 
analysis away from the defendant’s ease of litigation and towards the 
plaintiff’s need for relief. Such a shift has been advocated in the world of 
legal academia.284 Also, the Daimler decision has inordinately shrunk the 
scope of jurisdictional discovery, thus preventing plaintiffs from finding 
                                                
 281. Id. at 316–17. 
 282. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (“The canonical opinion in this area remains 
International Shoe . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918–19 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 
873, 880 (2011); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985); Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 283. See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245, 
250 (2014). 
 284. See Kate Bonacorsi, Not at Home With “At-Home” Jurisdiction, 37 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1821, 1853–54 (2014). 
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possible connection between a defendant and a forum state.285 All of these 
concerns lend credence to the new rule proposed in this article. 
CONCLUSION 
“The U.S. Supreme Court effected a sea change in general 
jurisdiction jurisprudence on Jan. 14, 2014, when it issued its decision in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman.”286 As such, many consider American personal 
jurisdiction law to be in disarray.287 The Supreme Court has strayed from 
the principles of general jurisdiction laid out in International Shoe and 
Perkins, stripping general jurisdiction of its power and relegating it to a 
minute position within personal jurisdiction doctrine. Although it is still 
possible to meet the strict Daimler test using lower court decisions and 
internet contacts, a new test is needed. Such a test would focus on the 
plaintiff’s right to a remedy and the ultimate fairness of exercising 
jurisdiction. Although this test is still not a bright line, and still fact-
intensive, such is the nature of personal jurisdiction. If the scope of general 
jurisdiction is opened up, the dangers of corporate shadow-games effecting 
personal jurisdiction will be lessened. And ideally, injured plaintiffs may be 
able to have their day in court against the parties that are actually 
responsible rather than a shallow-pocketed subsidiary. 
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